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Abstract— Over the past decade, the number of private-equity (PE) investments grew across the Southeast Asian 
markets, which was due to its rapid economic growth and lesser competition. However, while some believe that 
this has a positive impact to the economy, the real contribution of PE-backed transactions is unclear, as there is 
no study yet observing the nature of these transactions that specifically focuses on the Southeast Asian markets. 
This 6-month study examines the long-run stock performance of PE-backed initial public offering (IPO), by 
examining the historical data from the period of 1996 to 2016. This research uses market-adjusted and risk-
adjusted returns to calculate the long-term stock returns. The result indicates although the performance of PE-
backed IPOs differs in every market, generally, it underperforms almost all indices. However, it is less 
underperformed than the paired non-PE-backed IPO. This study aims to give an outlook of how a PE-backed IPO 
performs in the market. The finding is hoped to deliver some insights for financial sponsors, issuing firms, 
underwriters, and investors regarding the nature of the transactions in the Southeast Asian markets. 
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Introduction 
 
Private equity has grown exponentially in the Southeast Asia. Over 2000-2015, Asia-Pacific 
multiplies its total private-equity investment by about ten times (see Figure 1). Along with that, 
through a survey conducted by PwC in 2015, Asia has the second highest attractiveness level, after 
the US, for private-equity investment over the next five years (see figure 2). What makes Southeast 
Asia more interesting is the fact that the economic slowdowns in China has caused the foreign 
direct investments started to move from China to the ASEAN-5 countries (Indonesia, Singapore, 
Malaysia, The Philippines, Thailand) (see Figure 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Asia-Pacific private-equity investments (AVCJ, 2016) 
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Figure 2. Attractiveness level of regions for private equity investment over the next five years based 
on survey (PwC, 2016) 
 
The Southeast Asian markets have produced many great private-equity investments. In Indonesia, 
there was the infamous private-equity investment of Adaro Energy by Saratoga Capital, which 
profited nearly US$250 million from just an initial investment of US$50 million in 7 years (Adaro, 
2014). CVC Capital Partners, a British private-equity firm, also successfully turned Matahari 
Department Store into profitable, and reaped a sizeable return from the divestment (Van der 
Schaar, 2013). 
 
 
Figure 3. Foreign direct investments on ASEAN-5 (Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, The Philippines, 
and Thailand) and China (Bank of America Merrill Lynnch, 2014). However, the fortune story is only 
echoed from one side. While the private-equity firm pocketed huge profit, the IPO performance of 
Adaro slipped down for -245% in less than a year, which indicates a massive overvaluation. 
Moreover, several Malaysian companies, which were assisted by venture capital, one of private-
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equity business categories, also yielded disastrous IPO returns which caused them to be delisted 
from the board. 
Many questions arise because of that: Are private-equity and the issuing firms the only parties who 
are benefited from the investment? Does buying the private-equity backed initial public offering as 
a citizen-investor bring a sure investing catastrophe in the long run? Is it better to stay away from 
private-equity backed initial public offering and invest in other company in similar industry instead? 
 
Several empirical studies have been conducted to figure the long-run performance of private-
equity backed initial public offering, but none cover the Southeast Asian markets. Composing a 
new study is necessary as the result could be dissimilar due to the unique social, political, and 
cultural characteristics of the region (Bhalla, Harris, Khanna, Wu & Dolya, 2013). The aim of this 
study is to understand the major trend of the private-equity backed initial public offering’s 
performance by comparing it to the market and the non-private-equity backed initial public 
offering. The analysis would provide empirical evidence regarding private-equity backed initial 
public offering. Thus, investors, private-equity firms, issuing firms, and underwriters can use this 
study for future reference. 
 
Literature Review 
 
A company who is in need of capital can seek funding through capital market in which the company 
could either raises equity capital through initial public offering (IPO) or debt capital through bond 
issuance (Jenkinson & Ljungqvist, 2001). However, they need to go public to do so, which 
sometimes can be very complicated and expensive. The other option that a company can opt is 
through private equity. Private equity is an ownership of equity or debt securities on companies 
that are not publicly traded (BVCA, 2016), which basically an investment to private company. 
Private equity offers variety of products that fulfill many different capital needs of different stages 
of business. For example, private-equity firm offers venture capital for early start-ups, mezzanine 
capital and growth capital for growing business, leveraged buyout for mature business, and 
distressed securities for distressed companies (Lerner, 2000). 
 
Private-equity firms have their own role in the capital providing industry. However, their business 
incentives are questioned whether they really add up values to the whole process or they simply hit 
for profit while impairing the others (Ljungqvist, 2016). A study of private-equity backed 
companies’ performances are needed to justify the notion. However, private-equity backed 
companies’ performances are mostly concealed. As private companies, they do not have to disclose 
their performances to public. Fortunately, as private-equity firms can also divest their investment 
through initial public offering, several performances of those private-equity backed IPO can be 
attained. 
 
IPO Underperformance 
Stock performance can represent the real company performance (Fidelity, 2016). A company that 
performs well is demanded by investors causing an upward price movement, and vice versa. Thus, 
evaluating the company’s stock performance is a valid indicators of analyzing company’s 
performance. IPO are known for its consistent underpricing and underperformance, especially in 
developing countries’ markets (Ritter, 1991; Moshiran, Ng & Wu, 2010; Sullivan & Unite, 1998; 
Emasari & Tamara, 2012). However, several studies show an opposite finding on the private-equity 
backed IPOs; they outperform the market (Cao & Lerner, 2006; Chou, 2001; Brav & Gompers, 1997; 
Drathen, 2007; Bourrat & Wolff. 2013). Unfortunately, none covers the Southeast Asian markets. It 
is often hard to evaluate the long-run stock performance of the IPO firms due to uncertainty in 
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choosing appropriate methodology. However, there are five key factors in determining the 
outcome of long-run stock performance analysis, which are metrics, benchmark, methodology, 
time, and test statistics. 
 
It is important to use metrics in measuring abnormal returns, as the results may differ depending on 
which metrics used, for instance buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR), cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR), or wealth relatives (WR). The choice of benchmark also decides the results of the 
stock performance. Examples of the benchmark include the selection of a certain equity market 
index and the choice of a specific asset pricing model. Moreover, the methodology for the sectional 
aggregation, such as equal-weighted, value-weighted, or median abnormal returns, is also crucial in 
determining the outcome of the stock performance. Furthermore, analysis carried in an event time 
or a calendar time may also result in stock performance discrepancy. Lastly and the most 
importantly, the method and test statistics should be carefully selected, as to determine its 
statistical significance. 
 
    Factor  Example  
        
    Metrics  BHAR, CAR, WR  
        
    
Benchmark 
 Market Index, Other  
     
Control Group 
 
       
      
 Key factors in determining   
Methodology 
 Value-weighted, Equally-  
 
IPO performance 
   
weighted 
 
     
        
    Time  Calendar-time, Event-time  
        
    
Test Statistics 
 One sample t-test, Paired  
     
sample t-test 
 
       
        
 
Samples & Analyses 
The research conducts several analyses. The first analysis analyzes the event-time performance of 
private-equity backed IPO and the second analysis analyzes the calendar-time long-run 
performance of private-equity backed IPO, . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Research breakdown 
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65 private-equity backed IPOs are found on January 1996-June 2016 period, gathered from 
Thomson Reuter’s database. The sample gathering is following these criteria: the paired IPO should 
be issued within 24 months before or after the PE-backed IPO, the firm IPO’s sector, or at least its 
general industry, should be similar with that of the PE-backed IPO, and the market capitalization 
lies within one fifth to five times of the LBO-backed 
IPO’s. 
 
Results and Discussions 
 
Emasari (2010) finds that Indonesian IPOs significantly underperformed the market three and five 
years after their first offering from 1996 to 2001. A possible explanation would be that there are 
mismatch valuations between the issuance companies and the investors due to informational 
asymmetry. However, varying findings are found in other stock markets of the Southeast Asian 
countries; IPO underperformance in Singapore (Moshirian, Ng, & Wu, 2010), outperformance in 
Malaysia (Ahmad-Zaluki, Campbell, & Goodacre, 2007) underperformance in the Philippines 
(Sullivan & Unite, 1999), outperformance in Thailand (Allen, Morkel-Kingsbury, & Piboonthanakiat, 
1999). There is no evidence on Vietnam’s long-run IPO performance (Tran, 2014). 
 
The existence of private-equity firm assisting an IPO company may lessen the mismatch valuation 
from the issuing companies and the investors. Since IPO is one of PE firm's exit strategies, offering 
reasonable IPO price is necessary for their business sustainability. The idea is proved by several 
studies in the US and European markets (Schober, 2008; Drathen, 2007). Yet, there is no research 
focusing on the Southeast Asian markets.This study fixates on IPO transactions in the Southeast 
Asian markets comparing PE-backed IPO to a control group of non PE-backed IPOs. The 
performance is assessed under several measurements, including buy-and-hold, market-adjusted 
(BHAR), and risk-adjusted (Jensen’s alpha) returns in calendar and event time. 
 
 
Event Time 
The IPO performances are measured using buy-and-hold returns, market-adjusted returns, and 
Jensen's alpha with a timeframe based on the event occurrences. The buy-and-hold return 
calculates the percent change of the stock price after a certain period of time. The market-adjusted 
return subtracts the buy-and-hold return to the benchmark index return—to calculate the excess 
return the investors gain by not investing on the index. Jensen's alpha is measured by using time-
series regression of the stock daily excess return (to the risk-free investment) on the index daily 
excess return (to the risk-free investment). It measures the security's abnormal return over the 
expected theoretical return from the capital asset pricing model. 
 
The analysis is based on event-time with holding periods of 12, 24, 36, 48, and 60 months. The 
prices are determined from the closing price of the first-day transaction until the closing price of 
June 30th, 2016 transaction. However, there is several data unavailability; thus, the analysis uses 
the first available closing price, instead. For the significant test, the study applies statistical paired-
sample t-test. The research determines the mean buy-and-hold returns of 65 PE-backed IPOs stay 
on the negative area over four years, but rebounds in the fifth (see Table 1). The raw return is -
6.82% in the first year, -5.92% in the second, -5.44% in the third, -8.31% in the fourth, and 8.39% in 
the fifth. Unfortunately, most data fail to pass the significance test, with the only statistical 
significant result is in the second year. Therefore, there is not enough evidence to state whether 
PE-backed IPO outperforms non PE-backed IPO in the long run, in term of buy-and-hold return. 
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When market factor is taken into account, the mean returns remain negative over the observation 
period. Apparently, the return is getting worse every year. However, the test results are not 
statistically significant also. It cannot be concluded whether the PE-backed IPO is underperforming 
the matched IPO in the long run. The Jensen’s alphas are positive in all observed years. This implies 
PE-backed IPO perform better toward its benchmark. The IPOs have consistent positive abnormal 
return (alpha) with an average 0.06% per day. Moreover, the analysis has one significant result in 
the 60-month categories. However, since most alphas produce insignificant statistical results, the 
notion of PE-backed IPO outperformance cannot be approved, yet. 
 
Event Time Wealth Relative 
The performance is compared to different benchmarks. The benchmark used is based on the IPO 
origin’s market index; JKSE for Indonesian companies, KLSE for Malaysian companies, PSEI for The 
Philippines companies, SET for Thailand companies, STI for Singapore companies, HNX and VNI for 
Vietnam companies. The returns of both IPO and its index are calculated using buy-and-hold 
performance. The measurement uses three and five year holding period and equally weighted from 
all IPOs. 
 
The IPO calculation starts from its first day’s closing price to the closing price at the end of the 
expected time period. Subsequently, the index return is calculated using the closing price of the 
same period of the IPO. Wealth relative measures the IPO return relative to its benchmark. A 
wealth relative higher than 1 equals an underperforming IPO, while less than 1 wealth relative 
explains the opposite. From Table 2, almost all IPOs show an underperformance to their index, yet, 
the private-equity backed IPO is less underperformed than the non PE-backed IPO. Even though 
the performance of PE-backed IPO in the third year underperforms the market with a wealth 
relative of 0.78, these IPO outperforms the non PE-backed IPO who has lower wealth relative of 
0.65. In the fifth year, the PE-backed IPO also slightly beats the matched portfolio with a 0.74 
wealth relative compared to 0.73. Most countries are consistently outperforming the benchmarks, 
but Indonesia and Thailand. In third and fifth year, Indonesia underperform its benchmark in term 
of wealth relative. Thailand only underperforms in fifth year. 
 
Cohort Year 
To see the pattern of the PE-backed IPO performance, a yearly cohort performance is analyzed. 
The study is following Loughran & Ritter (1995) explanations regarding the correlation between the 
year of an IPO listing date and the stock price underperformance. The analysis uses buy-and-hold 
returns for both the IPO and index returns calculation. It compares the PE-backed IPO to non PE-
backed IPO. A wealth relative calculation is provided on each year to show the IPO performance 
relative to its index. A wealth relative above 1 indicates that the IPO outperforms the market, and 
vice versa. 
 
Table 3 displays the IPO performance based on listing year. Over a three-year performance, PE-
backed IPOs outperforms the market for 4 years in 1998, 1999, 2006, and 2007—which consist of 17 
IPOs. On the other hand, the 1999 (consist of 5 IPOs) is the only year non PE-backed IPO 
outperforms the market. Furthermore, over a five-year performance, the number of outperforming 
year increases. There are 5 listing years of PE-backed IPO that outperform the market, which are in 
1998, 1999, 2007, 2009, and 2010 (20 companies). On the same period, non PE-backed IPO 
outperforms the market in 1999, 2007, and 2011 IPOs (or 14 companies). There is a probable 
correlation between the PE-backed IPO performance and listing date. The year 1999 is the most 
profited cohort year, and year 2007 comes second. In both years, there were big financial 
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downturns happening. The 1999 is in the period of Asian financial collapse (coupled by the dot com 
bubble burst), while 2007 is in the period of global financial meltdown (due to the housing bubble 
burst). It shows that IPO in the Southeast Asian markets is performing better when crises arise 
which is consistent with the study of King & Banderet (2014) in the US market. 
 
Calendar Time 
The IPO performance can also be analyzed based on calendar time. The problem with event time 
tests is the arising potential biases from different IPO issuing dates between the PE-backed IPO 
and its paired IPO. Same-sized companies in the same industry often show a correlation in calendar 
time. The event time tests do not regard that factor; in consequence, the results may overstate the 
actual return from each year. Hence, a calendar time analysis can be implemented to address this 
correlation issue. 
 
Wealth Relative 
The analysis operates as if someone holds a portfolio consisting of PE-backed IPO only. The 
investment starts from January 1st, 1996 until December 31 st, 2015. The invested value of each IPO 
is equally weighted and rebalanced daily. The IPO is discarded from the portfolio once it has 
performed five-year. The returns are compounded overtime using buy-and-hold return and 
compared to their market benchmark. The wealth relative is calculated to examine whether the 
return outperforms the market. 
 
Table 4 shows that the returns of the PE-backed IPO and the non PE-backed IPO are trailing each 
other. The PE-backed IPO has better performance on the earlier years, but the non PE-backed IPO 
soon caught up and surpassed the PE-backed IPO returns on the middle observation period. On the 
latter period, both IPOs start to deliver similar results with the PE-backed IPO performs slightly 
better. At the end of the observation, the performance is reducing and causing an 
underperformance toward the market. However, the return of the PE-backed IPO portfolio is still 
higher than its control portfolio. 
 
Jensen’s Alpha 
The Jensen’s alpha is analyzed to determine the risk-adjusted return of the portfolio. The 
measurement is based on Jensen’s alpha model, which calculates the abnormal return relative to 
the expected theoretical return from the capital asset pricing model. The portfolio return is 
subtracted by the risk-free asset of each country (based on 10Y government bond of each country) 
and then regressed toward the excess market return. The result shows the alpha and beta along 
with its p-value and t-stats. The observation numbers and the adjusted R-squared values are also 
presented in the table. The regression delivers a statistically significant PE-backed IPO’s 
outperformance to the market. The PE-backed IPO portfolio has an alpha of 0.06% per day, or 
1.50% per month, and a beta of 0.69 (significant at 1% level). The result is corresponding with 
Drathen (2007) finding, which discovers a statistically significant alpha of 1.46% per month in his 
PE-backed IPO research of Germany stock market. However, the adjusted-R2 is considerably low 
with only 12% explaining that the portfolio doesn’t act much like the index. The non PE-backed IPO 
test also produces a satisfactory outcome. The alpha is 0.05% per day at 1% level significance. The 
beta is 0.66 which is also statistically significant. Unfortunately, the result also falls into the same 
drawback as the PE-backed IPO in which its adjusted R2 is very low at only 15%. 
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Conclusion 
 
The thesis analyzes the long-run performance of private-equity backed IPOs in the Southeast Asian 
markets. The lack of current understanding toward PE-backed IPO in the Southeast Asian markets 
has raised many questions regarding its long-run performance, especially by the investors who 
want to invest in those IPOs but are still not convinced due to the negative reputation of the IPO. 
From 65 samples of private-equity backed IPOs between 1996 and 2016, it can be concluded that: 
Based on event time, the PE-backed IPO outperforms the non PE-backed IPO in three-year 
performance with a mean return of -5.44%. However, when the return is adjusted to the market, 
the analysis shows no significant results. Jensen's alpha model also displays a statistical significant 
abnormal return of 0.11% per day in a five-year performance horizon. (See Table 1). 
 
Table 1 Event Time Performance of PE-backed IPOs 
 
      
 12 24 36 48 60 
 Months Months Months Months Months 
N 65 64 62 58 54 
Raw Return -6.82% -5.92% -5.44% -8.31% 8.39% 
 (1.00) (0.17) (0.09) (0.31) (0.59) 
Market- -8.34% -15.53% -24.56% -33.35% -37.98% 
adjusted      
Return (0.90) (0.29) (0.26) (0.41) (0.77) 
Jensen's      
Alpha 0.00% 0.05% 0.07% 0.08% 0.11% 
 (0.42) (0.55) (0.26) (0.21) (0.09) 
      
      
Note. The sample consists of 65 PE-backed IPOs between January 1996 and June 2016. The one-tailed significance levels 
reported in parentheses below are based on the one-sample t-test. 
 
The PE-backed IPO underperforms almost all indices, except the Thai SET Index, in three and five-
year performance, which is similar with IPO in general. However, thePE-backed IPO is less 
underperformed than the paired non PE-backed IPO. (See Table 2). 
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Table 2 Event Time Performance Vs Benchmarks 
 
          
   PE-Backed   Non PE-Backed  
   IPO Index Wealth  IPO Index Wealth 
 Benchmark N Returns Return Relative N Return Return Relative 
          
   Five year performance vs benchmark   
 JKSE         
 (Indonesia) 8 -27.88% 189.69% 0.25 8 -13.56% 150.73% 0.34 
 KLSE         
 (Malaysia) 13 -6.92% 34.14% 0.69 13 -37.69% 45.46% 0.43 
 PSEI (The         
 Philippines) 2 -62.38% -47.47% 0.72 2 -87.50% -54.56% 0.28 
 STI         
 (Singapore) 15 15.86% 29.63% 0.89 15 -4.29% 17.58% 0.81 
 SET         
 (Thailand) 10 59.85% 19.41% 1.34 10 110.12% 28.83% 1.63 
 VNI         
 (Vietnam) 10 -4.47% 0.78% 0.95 10 -12.45% 14.12% 0.77 
 Combined 58 6.10% 43.32% 0.74 58 2.39% 41.05% 0.73 
      
   Three year performance vs benchmark   
          
 JKSE         
 (Indonesia) 10 -17.08% 65.48% 0.50 10 6.46% 51.96% 0.70 
 KLSE         
 (Malaysia) 13 21.57% 25.02% 0.97 13 -34.17% 33.62% 0.49 
 PSEI (The         
 Philippines) 2 -1.98% -30.39% 1.41 2 -73.08% -34.86% 0.41 
 STI         
 (Singapore) 18 -6.56% 16.13% 0.80 18 -26.51% 6.41% 0.69 
 SET         
 (Thailand) 11 -8.13% 5.47% 0.87 11 -16.07% 1.79% 0.82 
 VNI         
 (Vietnam) 10 -35.83% -8.74% 0.70 10 -45.69% -4.03% 0.57 
 Combined 64 -7.19% 18.48% 0.78 64 -25.57% 15.34% 0.65 
          
          
Note. The sample consists of 65 PE-backed IPOs and 65 paired non PE-backed IPOs between January 1996 and June 
2016. The first section displays five-year performance vs benchmarks, while the second displays three-year 
performance vs benchmarks. 
 
The performance of PE-backed IPOs differs in every market. Indonesia and Thailand have 
underperforming PE-backed IPO compared to its paired non PE-backed IPO. On the opposite, the 
PE-backed IPO in Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam consistently outperforms its 
paired IPO. (See Table 2). The performance of PE-backed IPO gets better in the long run. There 
were 17 PE-backed IPOs that outperform the market on three-year performance basis. The number 
increases to 20 when the basis is changed to five-year performance. (See Table 3).  
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Table 3. Three Year Performance by Cohort Year Vs Benchmark 
 
                      
 
                      
 
    PE-Backed     Non PE-Backed   
 
 
Year 
 
N 
 IPO  
Index 
 Wealth  
N 
 IPO  
Index 
 Wealth  
 
    
Returns 
   
Relative 
  
Returns 
   
Relative 
 
 
                 
 
     Three year buy-and-hold return    
 
1996       1 -84.43% -31.66%  0.23  
 
1997 1 -59.52%  -31.20%  0.59 1 -61.73% -38.06%  0.62  
 
1998 1 55.56%  -29.57%  2.21       
 
1999 3 26.10%  -23.76%  1.65 5 -29.63% -35.82%  1.1  
 
2000 2 -55.78%  -19.32%  0.55 2 -3.12% 22.31%  0.79  
 
2001 3 -51.03%  110.30% 0.23 1 -10.71% 104.96% 0.44  
 
2002 2 -46.09%  85.64%  0.29 2 12.28% 90.46%  0.59  
 
2003 3 -72.76%  16.38%  0.23 1 -28.33% 44.16%  0.5  
 
2004 8 18.53%  39.58%  0.85 6 -34.36% 52.79%  0.43  
 
2005 7 14.74%  32.10%  0.87 6 4.74% 25.15%  0.84  
 
2006 5 42.48%  6.26%  1.34 9 -36.36% 2.00%  0.62  
 
2007 8 -10.01%  -13.20%  1.04 4 -5.41% -3.88%  0.98  
 
2008 4 -14.07%  22.66%  0.7 6 32.89% 42.16%  0.93  
 
2009 3 11.31%  41.14%  0.79 3 -52.86% -9.56%  0.52  
 
2010 5 -23.67%  9.91%  0.69 4 -70.46% 8.54%  0.27  
 
2011       2 -17.56% 28.09%  0.64  
 
2012 6 -17.15%  16.29%  0.71 3 -31.51% 2.26%  0.67  
 
2013 3 -33.17%  -8.91%  0.73 4 -38.92% -0.61%  0.61  
 
                 
     Five year buy-and-hold return    
 
1996       1 -97.23% -58.33%  0.07  
 
1997 1 -96.98%  -45.89%  0.06 1 -77.78% -50.79%  0.45  
 
1998 1 -27.78%  -49.05%  1.42       
 
1999 3 284.50%  30.47%  2.95 5 188.85% 6.08%  2.72  
 
2000 2 -50.24%  11.18%  0.45 2 33.96% 151.70% 0.53  
 
2001 3 -66.30%  292.34% 0.09 1 -61.90% 241.98% 0.11  
 
2002 2 -25.79%  200.87% 0.25 2 -8.50% 209.42% 0.3  
 
2003 3 -82.89%  4.14%  0.16 1 0.00% 83.22%  0.55  
 
2004 8 -14.89%  21.19%  0.7 6 -50.45% 18.50%  0.42  
 
2005 7 -3.98%  34.08%  0.72 7 12.58% 27.93%  0.88  
 
2006 5 10.56%  64.93%  0.67 8 -33.29% 33.07%  0.5  
 
2007 8 8.84%  -2.74%  1.12 5 51.50% 12.37%  1.35  
 
2008 4 -27.51%  52.44%  0.48 5 -7.67% 79.27%  0.52  
 
2009 4 67.36%  59.04%  1.05 4 -34.77% 24.59%  0.52  
 
2010 4 22.23%  11.47%  1.1 3 -57.41% 11.18%  0.38  
 
2011       2 81.25% 27.41%  1.42  
 
                      
 
                       
Note. The sample consists of 65 PE-backed IPOs and 65 paired non PE-backed IPOs between January 1996 and June 
2016. 
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PE-backed IPO portfolio performs really well in calendar time. A portfolio of PE-backed IPO can 
consistently outperform the market in five year holding periods. (See Table 5). The alpha of the 
portfolio statistically significantly outperforms the markets. The 0.06% daily or 1.5% monthly alpha 
is significant at 1% level. (See Table 6) 
 
Table 5 Regressions of Five Year Calendar-Time Portfolio Return 
        
 
    CAPM  
 
   PE-   Non PE-  
 
  Backed   Backed  
 
  Alpha 0.06% *** 0.05% *** 
 
  -2.94   -2.88  
 
 Beta 0.69 *** 0.66 *** 
 
  -22.12   -25.24  
 
 Observations 3653   3653  
 
 Adjusted R- 
0.12 
  
0.15 
 
 
  
Squared 
   
 
       
 
         
Note. The sample consists of 65 PE-backed IPOs and 65 paired non PE-backed IPOs between January 1996 and June 
2016. The robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. One, two and three asterisks indicate significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Table 6 Calendar Time Portfolio Performance Vs Benchmark 
             
    Long PE-Short Non PE   Short PE-Long Non PE  
Year   IPO  Wealth   IPO  Wealth  
End N  Returns Index Relative N Returns Index Relative  
             
     Five year buy-and-hold return    
2001 19 -82.97% -24.17% 0.22 19 -79.79% -24.17% 0.27  
2002 21 -87.52% -41.46% 0.21 21 -79.56% -41.46% 0.35  
2003 22 -96.92% -9.85% 0.03 22 -9.43% -9.85% 1.00  
2004 38 -65.84% -8.91% 0.38 38 -57.02% -8.91% 0.47  
2005 40 -61.10% -12.45% 0.44 40 -44.38% -12.45% 0.64  
2006 52 -64.87% 45.12% 0.24 52 -26.06% 45.12% 0.51  
2007 58 -38.83% 69.72% 0.36 58 -46.36% 69.72% 0.32  
2008 66 -26.17% 115.17% 0.34 66 -54.62% 115.17% 0.21  
2009 56 -12.89% 86.50% 0.47 56 -59.06% 86.50% 0.22  
2010 51 -0.15% -20.50% 1.26 51 -63.35% -20.50% 0.46  
2011 39 10.81% 22.76% 0.90 39 -64.47% 22.76% 0.29  
2012 36 12.11% 18.16% 0.95 36 -63.12% 18.16% 0.31  
2013 33 6.44% 17.96% 0.90 33 -60.25% 17.96% 0.34  
2014 27 -3.81% 187.54% 0.33 27 -43.12% 187.54% 0.20  
2015 20 22.42% 68.00% 0.73 20 -45.99% 68.00% 0.32  
             
             
             
Note. The sample consists of 65 PE-backed IPOs and 65 paired non PE-backed IPOs between January 1996 and June 2016. 
The samples are constructed into portfolios under the ‘long-short’ idea. 
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